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Agncultural Biotechnology in China 
An Unreachable Goal? 
Stanley P. KOWALSKI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recently there has been much discussion about the People’s Republic of China’s 
(PRc) investment in and commitment to agricultural biotechnology (agri-biotech). 
Rapid economic expansion, population growth and technological development are 
changing the PRC; accompanying these changes is increased demand for high-quality 
food and fibre. Agn-biotech is optimistically viewed as an important way to meet these 
demands. Whereas Chinese technological capacity in agri-biotech has advanced 
significantly over the past decade, it may be unable to meet these challenges. Even when 
this capacity is combined with good intentions, enlightened policy and large capital 
outlays, accelerated development of agri-biotech may nevertheless be precluded. 
Without a reliably enforced system of intellectual property rights (IPRs), the hoped for 
potential of agri-biotech may never be fulfilled. 
11. THE PRC AND AGRI-BIOTECH 
The leadership of the PRC views self-sufficiency in sustainable food and fibre 
production as a top national priority (Ding, 2001), and has designated agri-biotech 
research and development as a major strategy to realize this goal (Holland, 2000). This 
policy commitment has been implemented via increasing investment (Pray et aZ., 2002). 
Under the National Program on the Development of Basic Research (the “973 
Program”) and the Ministry of Science and Technology sponsored “863 Program”, 
investment in agri-biotech research and development has increased &om US$8 million 
in 1986, to US$ 112 million in 1999 (Huang et al., 2002), with some estimates of the 
1999 figure as high as US$ 300 million (Kalaitzandonakes, 2000; James, 2002a), to 
approximately US$ 350 million in 2000 (Holland, 2000), and then a commitment to 
further increase this investment to US$450 million by 2005 (James, 2002a). Since 1996 
there has been a steady increase in the total production of transgenic crops in China, 
with the 1.5 million hectares under cultivation in 2001 (James, 2001) increasing to 2.1 
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milhon hectares under cultivation in 2002 (James, 2002b). The economic stakes are 
high: projected economic returns &om investment in agri-biotech for rice and soybeans 
alone are estimated at over US$ 1 billion annually (Anderson and Yao, 2001). 
Several factors drive agri-biotech policy in the PRC. A growing population, with 
increasing affluence and a preference for dietary animal protein, has generated increased 
demand for feed grain, which is, however, complicated by a continuing loss of arable 
land. Projections generally concur that by 2030 the PRC’S population will stand at 
1.7 billion (Cai, 1990; Michalski et al., 1996; Zhang, 2000). A steady rise in per capita 
income, at 2.5 to 4.5 percent annually, is also likely (Michalski et al., 1996). Due to this 
continued economic growth and its attendant societal affluence, the Chinese diet has 
expanded, with an increased demand for animal protein. In 1996, the PRC’S average per 
capita consumption of animal protein was approximately half of Taiwan’s (Lumpkin, 
1996)-the two share nearly identical culinary cultures (Lumphn, 1996). Consistent 
with the PRC’S continued development and its culinary preferences (comparable with 
Taiwan’s), the per capita demand for animal protein is projected to double between 
1996 and 2020 (Lin et al., 1996; Pray and Fuglie, 2001). As a consequence, demand for 
feed grain is projected to nearly triple between 1996 and 2020 (Lin et al., 1996; Pray and 
Fuglie, 2001). Finally, and disturbingly, there is a steady loss of arable land in the PRC, 
the result of erosion, salinisation, desertification and urbanization (Lin et al., 1996; 
Zhang, 2000). The net rate of loss is alarming, estimated at 300,000 hectares per year 
(Cai, 1990). When taken together, the convergence of the afore-mentioned factors 
indicates that dynamic development and deployment of advanced agricultural 
technology, such as agri-biotech, will remain critical for the PRC’s continued food 
security (Lin et al., 1996). 
111. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF AGRI-BIOTECH TO THE PRC 
International transfer of agri-biotech can accelerate sustainable growth of agri- 
biotech capacity in developing countries (James, 1996); a reliable system of IPRS can 
facilitate this by creating an IPR-supportive atmosphere that encourages industrialized- 
nation-based agri-biotech corporations to develop and license innovations, such as 
tropical and sub-tropical genetically-enhanced crops and other suitable applications, 
which would be appropriate to the specific needs of developing countries (Kryder et al., 
2000; Boyd et al., 2003). However, since “developing countries” span the development 
continuum (Kowalski and Kryder, 2002), improved IPR protection will help some to 
progress, but for others wdl have little positive impact (Maskus, 2000). The benefits of 
IPRS are realized in countries where foreign direct investment, openness in the economy 
and human and physical capital accumulation gel (Maskus, 2001). In such countries, 
effective implementation and enforcement of IPRS will foster the next level of 
development. In the continuum of developing countries, the PRC appears to be 
positioned such that IPR capacity could be approaching this stage (Lesser, 2002). 
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Furthermore, it is highly likely that the PRC is at the point where imported agri- 
biotech will significantly promote the development and deployment of appropriate agri- 
biotech applications to meet current and future challenges in food/fibre production. 
Such reliance on the importation of technology is typical in the development of nations 
(Maskus, 2000), and the PRC has followed this route (Allison and Lin, 1999). The 
necessity of international agri-biotech transfer is underscored by the fact that 
corporations from industriahzed countries dominate the world’s agri-biotech industry 
(Huang et al., 2002; Kowalslu and Kryder, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003). Therefore, the PRC 
has much to gain via agri-biotech transfer partnerships, executed by licensing agreements 
with these corporations. However, as with other developing countries at a similar level 
of IPR capacity maturation, the question the PRC shall face is whether it is willing (or, 
perhaps, indeed able) to enforce IPR protection in agri-biotech poyd et al., 2003). 
The PRC’S nascent collaborations with industrialized-nation-based agri-biotech 
corporations have been limited-for example, Pioneer’s collaboration with the Cereals 
Breeding Institute on maize research; Pacific Seeds’ collaboration with the Provincial 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences on rapeseed/canola research (Pray, 1999); and the 
Monsanto/Delta and Pineland collaborative project with the Chinese National Cotton 
Research Institute to move Bt cotton varieties to the PRC (Pray et al., 2002). The most 
noteworthy and well-documented case has been the Monsanto project, where 
commercialization led to distribution of suitable varieties to smallholder cotton farmers 
throughout the northern PRC (Pray et ai., 2001). The spread of these varieties was rapid, 
with broad acceptance and significant success (Huang et al., 2002). The estimated 
aggregate monetary benefit to the nation was US$750 million in 2001 (James, 2002b). 
In spite of this, Monsanto earned only small returns on its investment, which is, at least 
partially, attributed to poor IPR protection (Pray et al., 2001). Monsanto, as well as other 
agi-biotech corporations, will carefully scrutinize inadequate protection of their IPRS, 
which will then influence decisions as to future agn-biotech transfer to and investment 
in the PRC (Rozelle et al., 1999). 
Iv. IPRS IN THE PRC: ENFORCEMENT AND THE JUDICIARY 
Although laws are in place and international treaties acceded to, the PRC’S current 
regime of IPR law enforcement is still inadequate. The PRC’s December 2001 accession 
to the World Trade Organization (Ding, 2001) obligates it to comply with the 
provisions written into the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement (Clark, 2000). TRIPS, as an attempt to internationally harmonise IPR 
law consistent with the standard in industrialized countries, defines the minimum 
standards of IPR protection for developing countries (Petherbridge, 2001); compliance 
includes establishing IPR protection for agri-biotech products and processes (Maredia et 
al., 2000). With respect to appropriate IPR laws on the books, the PRC is already largely 
TRIPS-compliant; enforcement, however, remains a problem (Clark, 2000). The PRC’S 
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commitment to IPR protection, at least on paper, is not limited to TRIPS. In 1980 the 
PRC joined the World Intellectual Property Organization, in 1985 the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of IPRS, in 1999 the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), in 1993 the Convention on Biological Diversity, and 
in 1985, the PRC enacted its own patent law, followed by further amendments in 1992 
and a major revision in 1993 (Ding, 2001). However, as with TRIPS, having laws on the 
books does not necessarily imply enforcement, which is a problem with IPK protection 
across the board in the PRC (Yu, 2000). 
In the PRC, enforcement of IPR law ranges from sporadc to non-existent (Yu, 2000); 
although the reasons for inadequacies in enforcement are multiple, one appears 
fundamental. For IPK inhngement in the PRC, penalties are weak: fines are low and few 
ihngers are ever incarcerated. There is poor financial support for IPR admmistration and 
enforcement (Clark, 2000), a lack of properly trained professionals to function as lawyers 
and judges (Orts, 2001), and many local officials do not understand the importance and 
urgency of IPK enforcement. Local protectionism and corruption is also widespread (Yu, 
2000). While these barriers to proper enforcement are important, they are, in an important 
sense, ancillary. As one excavates through them, the fundamental issue is uncovered: the 
Chmese Communist Party (CCP) continues to control and dominate the judiciary. Judges, 
subservient to the CCP’S rule, are subject to “ideological dscretion” as directed by the CCP 
(Orts, 2001). There is no independent judiciary in the PRC (Palmer, 2001). This is fbrther 
corroborated by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI, 2002), which “represents a 
systematic effort to quan t i~  aspects of the application of the law in a diverse group of 
countries.” (Lesser, 2002). Of 102 countries surveyed, the CPI ranks the PKC at 59, just 
below Colombia, and together with the Dominican Republic and Ethiopia. 
Judges in the PRC are elected or appointed by People’s Congresses, dominated by the 
policies of the CCP and reminded that judicial influence and the CCP’S leadership must 
remain consistent. Regardless of what IPR laws are on the booksand many are-judges 
do not primarily hold to the supremacy and rule oflaw, rather the most important juridical 
qualification is a f m  political stand, with adherence to the Four Basic Principles oE 
- Marxism-Leninism-Ma0 Zedong Thought; 
- dictatorship of the proletariat; 
- the Socialist road; and 
- 
As a consequence, the civil-law judiciary system in the PRC is highly politically 
influenced and unlikely to render any decision in opposition to the central government, 
with the result that the actual power of the courts is significantly diminished (Haskins, 
1999). 
leadership of the Party (E’ang, 1998). 
In the PKC, the CCP’S domination of the judiciary obfuscates the enforcement of 
IPRS. For the PRC’s judciary, the absence of truly independent judlcial review renders 
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its credibility questionable, as it is influenced by the ever-present, shifting political 
agendas of the authoritarian CCP. Lack of judicial independence fosters a climate of 
arbitrariness, wluch is the antithesis of the rule oflaw. Essentially, the situation in the 
PRC can more accurately be described as the rule by law, that is, “the use of law as an 
instrument of rule rather than a set of independently applicable legal principles.” 
(Palmer, 2001). This, in turn, creates a sense of uncertainty vis-2-vis IPR protection that 
will likely cause industridzed-nation owners of agri-biotech to be reluctant to risk 
licensing and transfer of their valuable, proprietary agri-biotech. Having laws on paper 
without a proper political or social infrastructure for enforcement will lead to persistent 
problems. To sum it up, if the PRC is unable to consistently and predctably protect the 
civil, political and property rights of its own citizens, it is unhkely that it will be able to 
protect the even more sophisticated rights, such as IPRS, of foreigners (Palmer, 2001). 
Owners of agri-biotech are aware of this. 
v. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF WEAK IPR ENFORCEMENT ON AGRI-BIOTECH 
DEVELOPMENT I  THE PRC 
Since a system of reliably enforced IPRS is essential for successful international agri- 
biotech transfer, inadequate IPR enforcement in the PRC could be a significant 
constraint to full utilization of agri-biotech. For continued, successful participation in 
the global economy, the PRC requires both a favourable economic climate and a reliable 
legal system, the two actually being “married”. Due to the increasing interdependence 
of these two in international technology transfer, any country that desires to be a full 
participant (and a full beneficiary) wdl need to comply with international standards of 
IPR protection (Palmer, 2001). Foreign corporations d, otherwise and 
understandably, be reluctant to risk licensing and transferring their proprietary 
technologies (Allison and Lin, 1999; Palmer, 2001), includmg the latest advances in agri- 
biotech (McCabe, 1998). 
Such an IPR/technology-transfer impasse will be further exacerbated by the fact 
that the licensing of IPRS is decreasingly “stand-alone” patent licensing and more and 
more patendtrade-secret “hybrid” licensing (Lemley, 2001; Bleeker et al., 2003). A 
patent essentially represents the tip of the IPR-iceberg, with trade-secrets hidden under 
the surface as ongoing technology transferred, i.e. the “workhorse of technology 
transfer” uorda, 1999). Accordingly, a strongly enforced IPR system, which de facto 
necessitates a credible and independent judiciary, is essential for such complex licensing 
agreements and partnerships. A rock-solid foundation for sustainable technology transfer 
relationships can thereby be constructed (Kowalski et af., 2002). On the other hand, by 
failing to adequately enforce IPR protection, the PRC will likely be limited to second- 
tier technology (Kowalski and Kryder, 2002), behind global standards and possibly 
nearly obsolete (Maskus, 2000). The PRC will thereby be precluded from accessing the 
latest advances in agri-biotech (McCabe, 1998). Finally, and critically, in addition to 
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increasing foreign investment and technology transfer, a system of reliably enforced IPRS 
will also foster indigenous research, development and commercialization in technology 
appropriate to a developing country’s needs and markets, for example, agri-biotech in 
the PRC (Maskus, 2000; Yu, 2000). 
The PRC’s expressed agenda regarding agri-biotech and its current IPR 
enforcement regime are contradictory; that is, there is a msconnection between 
government policy/investment and the current state of the PRC’s legal system. Although 
necessary, policies promoting and supporting agri-biotech are, by themselves, 
insufficient (Allison and Lin, 1999). Moreover, whereas the PRC is increasingly 
integrated into the global economy, it is at the same time, and paradoxically so, still 
operating under a legal regime that is dominated by the “rule of man” and not the “rule 
of law” (Sender, 1999). Indeed, a legal system alone does not necessarily imply rule of 
law. The CCP’S continued domination of the judiciary in the PRC generates a 
fundamental incompatibility between a reliable system of IPR enforcement and the 
current political organization (Wang, 1993; Orts, 2001). As a point of comparison, this 
incongruity between the policy commitment to a@-biotech and the lack of capacity 
requisite for international agri-biotech licensing and transfer is roughly analogous to the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, wherein rapid financial developments outpaced institutional 
capacity, creating an economic and financial crisis (Sharma, 2002). Similarly, due to a 
lack of juridical/institutional IPR enforcement capacity, the ambitious government 
policy objectives for agri-biotech in the PRC may be unattainable, with long-term 
consequences that are difficult to predict. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the PRC, with the food security of over one billion people to consider, a careful 
re-examination of current institutional roles, structures and priorities may well be timely 
and judicious. Weak enforcement of IPRs, a major concern for industrialized-country- 
based corporate owners of agri-biotech (Rozelle et al., 1999), could significantly 
attenuate the flow of advanced agri-biotech into the PRC. This will likely continue until 
reliable and convincing changes are made, affecting transition to an independent 
judiciary that credibly and consistently enforces the PRC’S IPR law, a lot of which is 
already on the books. Such fundamental changes in policy necessady occur at the 
national level (Maredia et al., 2000)-in the case of the PRC, the central government in 
Beijing. Change can be measured. For example, the gradual transformation of the 
Taiwanese judiciary towards greater independence has followed economic, business and 
technological development over several decades (Wang, 1998). 
Whatever the mode or schedule, changes must nonetheless be prioritized. As either 
a national institution (Orts, 2001) or national infrastructure (Shenvood, 2002), IPRs are 
essential to economic development. However, when an enfeebled judiciary cannot 
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enforce IPRS, the benefits of technology transfer and development are lost, which, in 
turn, leads to other, considerable, losses to a country (Shenvood, 2000). Although a 
developing country might realize a limited benefit from refusing to comply with 
internationally recognized standards for IPR protection in the short term, any longer- 
term benefits are dubious at best, and likely outright inimical to fully accessing and 
utilizing suitable advanced technologies for the development and production of crops 
that these same countries increasingly need (Boyd et al., 2003). 
To play any game, it is not enough to just have a rulebook. One also needs to 
demonstrate respect for and compliance with the rules. Agri-biotech development and 
deployment in the PRC has been prioritized as a vital national objective. However, IPR 
enforcement, a critical factor in international technology transfer and domestic 
technological progress, is not a game-it is a serious state of affairs. The stakes are high, 
time is limited and demands are converging. In the PRC, enforcing IPRS wdl advance 
national policy, strengthen agri-biotech development, enhance food security, and, 
generally, just be good for business. 
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